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Abstract 
Despite numerous attempts to reorganize state government aimed at streamlining, reducing, 
and creating greater efficiencies, the size and scope of Connecticut’s administrative apparatus 
has grown considerably over a fifty year period.  This study will trace the political history of 
previous reorganization efforts with a particular emphasis on more recent attempts such as the 
Etherington (1970), Filer (1976), Gengras (1977), Thomas (1991), and Hull-Harper 
Commissions (1992). Observed trends follow national patterns:  1) reorganization 
commissions are cyclical in nature and more likely to be undertaken in the wake of similar 
efforts at the federal level and 2) they are more likely to be undertaken during periods of state 
fiscal retrenchment.  A movement away from comprehensive reform efforts to incremental 
approaches is another cross-national pattern that has been detected in recent reform efforts.  
A review of Connecticut’s experience with state reorganization demonstrates that despite the 
concerted effort by both the executive and legislative branches to alter administrative 
structures, reorganization recommendations are seldom implemented due to the opposition of 
the state legislature and interest groups.   
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1. Introduction  
With severe fiscal crises affecting state governments across the United States, governors are 
increasingly turning to state reorganization as a tool to reign in government spending and 
close budget gaps for fiscal year 2011 (National Governors Association 2010).  While 
Connecticut has experienced budget deficits periodically since the 1970s, the current budget 
deficit is the largest in state history.   With an eye towards a more efficient and effective 
government, Connecticut governors since Wilbur Cross have utilized their powers to initiate 
state reorganization as a means to achieve greater control over the executive branch and in 
more recent years to reign in government spending.  Yet despite numerous attempts to 
reorganize state government aimed at streamlining, reducing, and creating greater efficiencies, 
the size and scope of Connecticut’s administrative apparatus has grown considerably over a 
fifty year period.  This increase in the size and scope of government raises the question of 
how effective state reorganization efforts have been in the past and what the future prospects 
are for those who attempt the same.   
This study will trace the political history of state reorganization with a particular emphasis on 
more recent attempts such as the Etherington (1970), Filer (1976), Gengras (1977), Thomas 
(1989-91), and Hull-Harper Commissions (1992).  Administrative reorganization has been 
an abiding concern among state governments since the advent of the Progressive Era’s quest 
to create a science of management.  Connecticut’s attempts at reorganization mirror national 
patterns in the following respects:  1) state reorganization is cyclical in nature and more 
likely to be undertaken in the wake of similar efforts at the federal level, 2) it is more likely to 
be undertaken during periods of state fiscal retrenchment and 3) since the 1990s, 
reorganization has retreated from comprehensive reform efforts in favor of more incremental 
and piecemeal approaches.  In terms of prospects for the adoption and implementation of 
reorganization plans, a review of Connecticut’s experience demonstrates that despite the 
concerted effort by governors to alter administrative structures and streamline government 
operations, reorganization recommendations are seldom implemented in their entirety due to 
the opposition of the state legislature and interest groups.   Finally, the paper will offer 
some predictions with respect to Governor Malloy’s most recent proposal to reorganize state 
government in light of lessons drawn from previous gubernatorial attempts at reorganization 
in Connecticut. 
2. The Rage to Reorganize 
The interest in government reorganization has been a century-old struggle that was born out 
of the scientific management movement at the turn of the twentieth century.  As James 
Conant (1988) observed, the wellsprings of state reorganization was Woodrow Wilson’s 
(1887) seminal work  “The Study of Administration”.  The first to suggest that there should 
be a separate discipline known as government administration distinct from politics, this 
politics/administration dichotomy led to other Progressive Era reformers to emphasize the 
now familiar and oft repeated mantras of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy as the 
guiding principles of the new science of administration.   Soon to follow were government 
attempts to implement these principles beginning with the Brownlow Committee Report of 
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1937 which was inspired by Luther and Gulick’s (1937) “Papers on the Science of 
Administration”.  Chief executives, be they presidents or governors, have sought to achieve 
greater organizational control as they endeavored to “faithfully execute the laws.”  Staking 
their careers on their ability to effectively implement their policy agendas, chief executives 
have had to contend with unwieldy organizational structures that have grown in a haphazard 
or unplanned fashion, often by accretion over the course of time.  The net result has 
impeded gubernatorial efforts to exert greater control over the executive branch.  In 
Connecticut, various commissions have been convened at periodic intervals throughout the 
twentieth century, at the behest of governors, to study and make recommendations regarding 
administrative structures.     
Collectively, these efforts have comprised part of a larger tradition in the United States 
known as the administrative reorganization movement.  AE Buck’s seminal work The 
Reorganization of State Governments in the United States (1938) took the general principles 
set forth by federal reformers and applied them to state government.  The major principles 
or goals of state reorganization according to Buck are: 1) concentration of authority within 
the chief executive, 2) functional integration of independent agencies, 3) the avoidance of 
boards for purely administrative work, 4) coordination of staff services, 5) independent audits, 
and 6) recognition of a governor’s cabinet. Taken together these principles also comprise 
what Bell (1974) termed “the cabinet” model of government which sought to give the 
governor greater control over the executive branch through fewer agencies, a high degree of 
functional consolidation, and the ability of the governor to appoint department heads. 
With respect to the first of Buck’s principles, the call for greater executive control was in 
reaction to the deliberate creation of weak state governors by colonial legislatures.  Owing 
to the British colonial experience, the framers of state constitution were reluctant to vest too 
much power in the chief executive.   In fact, as Devine (2006) observed: “During the 
Revolutionary period, many considered governors tyrants for enforcing what were perceived 
to be the abusive policies of King George III.  From this came the stigmatization of 
gubernatorial power that discouraged a strong governorship through early U.S. history.” (p. 
29)  
Since many states were still living under constitutions that were designed during colonial 
times, conventions were called during the 1960’s prompted primarily by the need to comply 
with the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Reyonolds v. Sims (1964) that called for “one man, 
one vote”.   While at the conventions, delegates addressed other outstanding issues in order 
to modernize their state governments.  In reference to the executive branch, however, only 
two major provisions touch upon gubernatorial powers with respect to constitutional grants of 
authority that brings to bear upon state reorganization.  Article Fourth is a tersely worded 
portion of the Connecticut state constitution which in section five vests supreme executive 
power in the governor and section twelve that states “He shall take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.” (CSG Article Fourth).  Endeavoring to faithfully executive the laws, 
governors have run headlong into a variety of institutional roadblocks.  Despite the 
clarification of language in the 1965 constitution that granted the governor executive powers, 
when they have attempted to use their powers to reorganize the executive branch agencies 
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entailing the consolidation or elimination of agencies, the state legislature has not always 
cooperated.  In some cases, it has looked upon with disfavor such actions as breaching 
separation of powers principles by treading into a domain that they viewed as their legislative 
prerogative.  This has been especially the case with respect to boards and commissions.  
State legislatures, as Conant points out, (2000) created these entities to oversee the programs 
and agencies they created which often lay outside the control of the governor.  Independent 
boards and commissions have been problematic for governors throughout the United States 
and their reorganization or merger into cabinet departments and/or abolishment have often 
met with fierce resistance from clientele groups.   
Accompanying the rise of a more modernized state government apparatus vis a vis 
constitutional reform, there also emerged what Sabato (1983) identified as a new type of 
governor.  No longer content to be relegated to secondary status behind state legislatures, “a 
“new breed’ of governor graced statehouses beginning in the 1980s poised to assume greater 
responsibility for administrative matters.”    
While reducing the size and scope of government has been sought in tandem with reform 
efforts, it is often a secondary goal.  In fact, some scholars have viewed the 
economy/efficiency imperative as a rhetorical device employed by governors to provide 
legitimacy for political interests. (Garnett 1980)   In Connecticut, there have been several 
commissions which span the better part of the 20th century in an attempt to capture these 
principles within state government.  The work of these commissions and their results 
comprise the bulk of the following analysis. 
3. Literature Review 
Reorganization began at the federal level of government and later spread among the fifty 
states.  The general principles were subsequently adopted by state governments in four 
consecutive waves.    The wave metaphor was first coined by James Garnett (1980) and 
covers the times periods of (1914-1936), (1937-1946), (1947-1975), and the late 1970s to the 
present.  Each of these successive time periods was inspired by federal efforts and parallels 
many of the same foci of concern present at the federal level.  During the first half of the 
20th century, The Taft, Brownlow and Hoover Commissions were the primary catalysts for 
reform.  The Brownlow Committee, commissioned to study the executive branch of federal 
government under FDR, underscored the importance of such management principles as unity 
of command and a limited span of control, which, while well recognized, were not being put 
into practice (Conant 1988, 893).  Similarly, the Hoover Commission, chaired by former 
president Herbert Hoover, set off a wave of reform effort in the states referred to as the Little 
Hoover commissions (Heady 1952).    
While scholars have been in disagreement as to why reorganization occurs, they have 
generally isolated two or three key factors that appear to be salient.   In referring to this 
confluence of factors, Chakerian (1996) captures this sentiment well with the following 
observation: 
Fundamental long-term trends in economic performance as well as trends in what is 
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fashionable in policy affect demands for governmental actions by political interests.  These 
pressures for action, however, must cope with an institutional environment that may facilitate 
or block access to the governmental decision agenda. (p. 28)   
Economic factors such as fiscal crises are often the impetus for state reorganization efforts, 
particularly in the latter part of the 20th century.  After a long period of economic growth 
during the Post World War II era which continued unabated through the advent of Great 
Society, new state services and regulations required increased government expenditures.  
The size and scope of government was increasing without the accompanying managerial 
control mechanisms to guide much of the new activities.  During economic boom periods 
immediately after World War II, reorganization was not viewed mainly as an attempt to reign 
in government spending but rather as an end in and of itself to promote better structural 
alignment for more efficient service delivery.   As economic downturns and inflationary 
pressures during the 1970s’ began to strain state budgets, state reorganization was viewed as a 
means to streamline government and achieve cost savings.  In his cross-national study 
covering the period of 1900-1985, Conant (1992) found that state reorganization efforts were 
undertaken in the midst of periodic fiscal crises confronted by state governments.  Similarly, 
Garnett (1980) and Chackerian (1996) also found empirical support for the proposition that 
state reorganization efforts among the states were preceded by long-wave economic decline.  
Compounding these economic downturns was a gradual increase in the size of government.  
With the advent of Great Society federal programs, the 1960s gave rise to increased state 
expenditures due to massive increases in state services and regulations.  The size and scope 
of government was increasing without the accompanying managerial control mechanisms to 
guide much of the new activities.    
While economic downturns undoubtedly lend a sense of urgency and provide a rational for 
governors to legitimize reorganization, alone they are not sufficient to achieve the adoption of 
reorganization plans.  Governors may initiate reorganization efforts, however the 
institutional environment has been shown to be a key factor in the likelihood of adoption of 
reform measures by state legislatures.  As a co-equal branch, party control of state 
legislatures is an important explanatory variable.  Institutional power struggles between the 
executive and legislative branch often occur over reorganization due to the legislature’s 
concern over loss of control (Chi 1992).  Chakerian (1996, 36) hypothesized that 
reorganizations would be more likely to occur when there is high legislative party 
competition, when the governor’s party controls the legislature and during long-wave 
economic downturns.  However, the expected finding that the governor’s party control of 
the legislature coupled with legislative competition would result in more frequent state 
reorganizations is at odds with his findings.  In fact, after conducting a cross national study, 
he found that these conditions were actually less propitious for formal reorganization events.   
Formal reorganization events were fewer when the governor and the majority in the 
legislature shared the same party label.  He posited that under conditions of party control, 
the governor will not have to resort to formal reorganization mechanisms to achieve his/her 
managerial objectives.  Informal channels of control can accomplish the same objectives in 
a less costly and contentious manner.   
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While cross-national studies in the area of state reorganization have been important in 
delineating general trends and patterns among the states, this study will utilize a case study 
approach.  Connecticut shares some similarities with its sister states, it also posses certain 
characteristics that make it a divergent case in some important respects.  By utilizing a case 
study method, this paper will capture some of the complexities and level of contextual detail 
not afforded by other cross-national comparisons. 
4. Scope of Reorganization Efforts 
Inspired by AE Buck and Luther Gulick, early state reform efforts during the first three waves 
were far reaching in scope (Rabin and Dodd 1985).   The reorganization literature 
distinguishes between two major types of reorganization, comprehensive and incremental 
(Berkman and Reenock 2004).  Comprehensive reorganization entails “the creation, 
abolition or the reorganization of at least four discrete agencies involving a total of four or 
more functional areas” (Garnet 1980, 285).  Comprehensive state reorganization efforts 
were characterized by their ambitious plans to effect sweeping overhauls of administrative 
structures.  These often entailed studying the machinery of state government with an eye 
towards streamlining and modernizing the entire administrative apparatus.  Typically 
commissions charged with the task of reorganization often attempted to study every agency 
within the executive branch in order to encounter the optimal administrative structure which 
would foster greater managerial control.  Comprehensive reorganization has a number of 
advantages and disadvantages.  Among the advantages, comprehensive organization permits 
the legislature to consider the plan in its entirety.  On the other hand, Young (2003) found 
that: 
Disadvantages to comprehensive restructuring legislation are mainly that some of the 
portions of the proposed legislation are so controversial or otherwise unacceptable to the 
legislature that the whole restructuring bill atrophies or dies.  (p. 16) 
Furthermore, Conant (1988, 894) found that the primary reason for abandoning such large 
scale reorganization efforts was due to legislative resistance.  Further fueling skepticism of 
comprehensive reform efforts were lingering doubts about the true cost savings associated 
with reorganizations which were often difficult, if not impossible, to document.   
Some scholars (Chakerian 1996; Chi 1992) have taken to task the portrayal or 
characterization of anything less than total reorganization as failure and instead have argued 
for a revised understanding of what they term partial or incremental consolidation.    
Restructuring activities may occur in piecemeal fashion over a period of time rather than in 
one fell swoop.    These ongoing efforts may be just as important and yield substantial 
outcomes even though they occur gradually.  Berkman and Reenock (2004) have argued for 
a revised understanding of reorganization to include what they term incremental 
consolidation. These restructuring activities occur in piecemeal fashion over a period of time, 
including different time periods.  As Rabin and Dodd (1985) observed, “reorganizing since 
1981 has been more incremental involving only a few agencies at a time.” 
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Table 1   Connecticut State Reorganization 1970-1977     




Implemention by State 
Legislature 
         
         
      821 Creation of the Department of  
1971 Etherington comprehensive   Commerce and Motor Vehicles 
         
      reduce departments Departments reduced to 21 
1976 Filer comprehensive  from 23-16   
       Creation of OPM 
       Creation of DAS 
         
1977 Gengras partial   biennial budget biennial budget 
      zero-based budgeting program budgeting 
      program budgeting   
      strengthen governor's   
      role in collective   
      Bargaining   
                
Changes that occur incrementally over time may be no less significant than those undertaken 
in a comprehensive fashion.  Reorganization plans and ideas that were raised in earlier time 
periods and not implemented may be subsequently gain favor by later legislatures. 
As Table 1 illustrates, attempts to reorganize state government in Connecticut adhere to some 
of the general patterns and trends detected in other states.  State reorganizations during the 
1970s were undertaken in the midst of economic downturns and fiscal crisis and were 
generally comprehensive in scope.  During the 1990s, economic downturns and fiscal crisis 
characterized the two major attempts at reorganization.  The Hull-Harper Commission 
(1992) did diverge from the trend away from comprehensive reorganization in its initial 
mandate which was limited in scope.  In actuality, the commission achieved far greater 
success than all other previous commissions by merging and consolidating four major 
agencies. 
5. A Brief History of State Reorganization in Connecticut 
While the first reorganization effort began as early as 1935 under Governor Wilbur Cross, 
this paper will focus on more recent reorganization commissions that have occurred since 
1970.  An overview of these reorganization efforts demonstrates that Connecticut follows 
many similar patterns as its sister states in terms of the timing and scope of reform efforts as 
well the same pitfalls issues with respect to the adoption and implementation of plans.   
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5.1. The Etherington Commission (1970): Into the Ether 
There were two major reorganization attempts during the 1970s which Gargan (2000) dubbed 
“the Golden Era of State Reorganization”.  Fiscal crisis served as the backdrop for the 
Etherington Commission.  As noted by the government watchdog group Connecticut Public 
Expenditure Council:    
General fund spending had risen by 483% and the number of state employees by 69% 
between FY 1960 and 1972.  This vast expansion of government, the commission said, would 
create continued pressure for higher taxes.  More self-discipline within government and a 
reorganization of the executive branch were urgently needed to enable to the state to continue 
to delivery needed services while avoiding the need to raise economically burdensome new 
taxes. (CPEC, 7) 
The Governor’s Commission on Services and Expenditures (1970) otherwise known as the 
Etherington Commission, was illustrative of the types of reform efforts underway throughout 
many of the states during the 1970s.  The commission, appointed by Republican Governor 
Meskill, was mainly comprised of business executives, was privately funded and worked 
without legislative authorization.  The commission’s work was comprehensive and resulted 
in 821 recommendations which covered ninety-one departments, agencies, boards and 
commissions.  The major thrust of the proposals was to streamline and consolidate agencies 
in order to reduce the number from thirty three to fifteen all under the governor’s control 
(CPEC, 8).  However, many of the commission’s recommendations never saw the light of 
day.  As Morton Tenzer, a long-time scholar and observer of Connecticut state government 
put it:   
The General Assembly, however, with Democratic majorities in both House and Senate, was 
skeptical of the validity of the commission appointed by Governor Meskill.   Just as 
Republican-dominated legislatures have failed to enact the recommendations of the 
Democratic governors Cross and Bowles, the legislature in 1972 did not undertake 
enactment of the Etherington Commission Recommendations. (Tenzer, p. 158). 
This finding is illustrative of the one of the key dynamics related to the relative success in 
terms of legislative adoption of reorganization plans.  The important institutional variable 
referenced earlier can be seen at work in this case.  It also illustrates Conant’s 22 state study 
finding that the most successful state reorganization efforts occurred in instances of low or 
moderate gubernatorial/legislative conflict (1988, 895).   
In actuality, some of the more modest recommendations made by the Etherington 
Commission were adopted by the state legislature.  For instance, the creation of a new 
Department of Commerce and the reorganization of the Department of Motor Vehicles were a 
few of the items that survived the legislative process.   Perhaps owing to the fact that 
Democrats held a majority during this time period, 47% of the 151 recommendations 
requiring legislative action were judged not to be worthy of implementation, as opposed to 
just 18% of the 684 requiring executive action.” (CPEC, p. 9)  Those that were rejected by 
the legislature included the consolidation of the Treasurer’s and Comptroller’s Offices and 
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Finance and Control and Tax Departments into one agency.   Also jettisoned were proposals 
to eliminate independent governing boards for state institutions of higher education and to 
separate the Farmington Health Center from the University Connecticut.  As Tenzer further 
noted, that despite the aforementioned changes, the Connecticut state government “still 
remained basically “unreformed” as far as the basic structure of its operations.” (Tenzer, 149).   
5.2. The Filer Commission (1976):  Reorganizing Without Reducing the Size of 
Government 
The Filer Commission on the Structure of State Government, so named after John Filer, a 
former Republican state senator and chairman of Aetna Life and Casualty was convened in 
1976.   Fiscal crisis was once again the backdrop for this commission as it had been for the 
previous Etherington Commission.   Now that the commission operated during a 
Democratically-controlled legislature and under Democratic Governor Ella Grasso, it should 
have been a propitious circumstance to undertake reorganization.  The Filer Commission 
recommendations fared somewhat better than its predecessor.  After intense lobbying by 
various special interest groups, the proposal to reduce cabinet level departments from 26 to 
13 resulted in only a reduction down to 21 departments.  While only a partial victory, the 
Filer Commission did make its mark on Connecticut state government most notably for the 
creation of two major staff agencies, the Office of Policy and Management and the 
Department of Administrative Services. 
A review of the legislative debates in the spring of 1977 provides a glimpse at how the 
recommendations of the Filer Commission fared in the General Assembly.  Deliberations on 
Senate Bill 357 An Act concerning the Reorganization of the Executive Branch of State 
Government on May 23, 1977 commenced after several months of work on the bill by the 
Government and Administration Policy Committee.  Senator Wayne Baker, the co-sponsor 
of the bill, introduced the day’s proceedings by outlining the principles guiding the bill.  A 
passage from Baker’s speech carries several of Buck’s tenets for good state government 
including unity of command, span of control and functional government.  Baker prefaced 
his introductory remarks with the observation of the rapid expansion of state government and 
the accompanying creation of new organizational units without consideration for the existing 
structure.  Connecticut needed to structurally align agencies to match this new growth in 
order to facilitate service delivery. 
We have followed certain principles in the bill…There should be fewer departments reporting 
to the Governor.  It is impossible for a governor to manage an extremely large number of 
independent departments and it is equally difficult for that Governor to establish priorities 
where every agency has as much access as the Department of Health, the Department of 
Consumer Protection or Economic Development. (p. 11) 
To its credit, unlike the Etherington Commission, the Filer Commission did make an attempt 
to be more participatory by holding public hearings around the state in order to solicit input 
from various stakeholders in state government.  In fact, in registering his opposition to the 
bill Senator Hudson remarked about the lobbying activity with the following:  “I have been 
extremely displeased with the carryings on of some of the members of state government and 
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lobby groups outside of state government in their attempts to impress upon us their position.” 
(p. 27) In an effort to be inclusive, however, they may have unwittingly provided more 
opportunities for opposition to express their disapproval for the plan and thereby preserve 
some of the agencies slated for elimination.  Groups that testified during public hearings 
were the State Employees Association, the League of Women Voters, and major department 
heads of state government agencies (p.9).  Twenty-eight unaffiliated agencies outside the 
control of the governor remained intact as the result of interest group lobbying.   During 
legislative deliberations, some Senators expressed their opposition to the bill.  The 
objections ranged from the view that the reorganization plan was either too bold or in some 
cases did not go far enough.  For example, Senator Hudson did not believe that 
reorganization should be wielded like an ax to get rid of commissions without consideration 
as to how well they might be functioning (Senate proceedings, May 23, 1977.    Other 
Senators expressed doubts that the reorganization would bring about cost savings and 
reduction in personnel that have been advertised by the bill’s proponents.  One senator asked 
whether the state would still have 45,000 employees and another remarked that there was no 
indication as to how the bill would control costs (Senate proceedings, May 23, 1977, p. 94).  
In a final plea for Senate Bill 357 before the final vote was taken, Senator Hudson offered the 
following remarks: 
Political parties have alternated in power, societies change, state population has doubled in 
Connecticut and the economy has risen up and down.  What has not changed over the years 
is the observation by all of the reorganization commissions that the executive branch of 
Connecticut government needs to be structured so that it can be more accountable to the 
people and their representatives.  The Cross Commission stated the thesis in 1937 when it 
noted in its report that the principles of administrative decentralization and of checks and 
balances have been carried to an extreme in this organization… There is strong support for 
this reorganization effort by the public. (Senate Proceedings, May 23, 1977, p. 77) 
Senate Bill 357 passed with 29 voting in favor and 7 opposed. 
The most significant development to emerge from the Filer Commission was the creation of 
the Office of Policy and Management which centralized staff planning and analysis in the 
governor’s office adding considerable policy expertise as well as a mechanism to assist the 
governor in formulating the budget.  Underscoring the centrality of OPM’s role in the 
executive branch, Tenzer offered the following:  
After the Governor, the Secretary of OPM is the most powerful person in state government.  
The Secretary not only works closely with the Governor to formulate the budget, but he also 
becomes the chief lobbyist promoting the budget to the legislature.  All other state agencies 
may be helped to expand their activities by favorable decisions made at OPM, or conversely, 
may have their programs diminished by negative judgments about their requests. (Tenzer, p. 
157) 
Since 1977, OPM has been a mainstay in the executive branch and a source of gubernatorial 
power and expertise.  As the right arm of the chief executive, OPM prepares the governor’s 
budget, coordinates interagency policies and intergovernmental relations. 
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5.3. The Gengras Commission Financial Management Task Force (1977) 
Once again, financial crisis was the backdrop for the Gengras Commission convened by 
Democratic Governor Grasso.  Despite the imposition of a sales tax increase, Connecticut 
had a $140,000,000 budget deficit that prompted further borrowing.  It was amid these 
difficulties that Governor Grasso sought to improve the state’s financial management by 
creating a commission whose charge was to identify ways to improve financial practices 
(CPEC, 16).  Like other state governments during the 1970s, Connecticut experienced a 
burgeoning of programs in health, welfare, and regulation without the accompanying 
managerial capabilities to support these new responsibilities.  Among the recommendations 
made by the Commission were updating accounting and control systems, better planning and 
budgeting, the use of long-range financial planning horizons and the provision of more timely 
information to make policy decisions. 
The commission also included measures to assist with the implementation of the 
recommendations such as a two-year financial plan, program budgeting and zero based 
budgeting.   While numerous bills were introduced during the 1978 and 1979 legislative 
sessions, many were not acted upon.  The commission report supported the Filer proposal to 
create the Office of Policy and Management.   It also sought to address the state’s financial 
planning, budgeting and control processes which were found to be inadequate.      






Legislature    
1989 Thomas Comp. Centralization of Commission 
   technology functions was discontinued 
   Appointment of chief  
   operating officer   
   to oversee agencies  
   
Creation of management 
division in OPM  
   Return to biennial  
   Budgeting  
   Privatization of   
   certain state services  
1992 Hull-Harper Partial 12 health and human 12 health and human services 
   services consolidated agencies  consolidated into four 
   into four  
   
Reorganization of higher 
ed biennial budgeting 
   Consolidate the Dept. 
Creation of Office of Finance within 
OPM 
   of Developmental  
   and Rehabilitative Services 
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5.4. The Thomas Commission to Study the Management of State Government (1989-1991) 
With the passage of more than a decade since the last state reorganization commission, the 
state government workforce had grown from 38,300 in 1972 to 54,184 in 1992 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, State Summary Table).  Accompanying the growth in government employees, the 
number of independent boards and commissions created by the legislature mushroomed.   
Much like the commissions that preceded it, the impetus for the Thomas Commission was a 
fiscal crisis.  The legislature appointed a 23 member commission to comprehensively review 
the entire state government.  Appointed by Governor William O’Neill, DeRoy Thomas, 
chairman of the Hartford Insurance Group along with hired consultants studied every state 
agency and function from 1989-1991.  The commission recommended the centralization of 
information technology functions, the appointment of a chief operating officer for the day to 
day oversight of state agencies, a return to biennial budgeting, and increased privatization of 
services for an overall savings of $500 million a year (Historical Note, Connecticut State 
Library, 2007) which were met with skepticism and criticism on the part of the union for its 
exclusive focus on cutting expenditures.  In a nod to long-range planning, the biennial 
budget passed later as Public Act 91-3 in June 1992 as part of a special legislative session.  
The work of the Thomas Commission was discontinued and then later restarted under the 
Hull-Harper Commission. 
5.5. The Hull-Harper Commission to Effect Government Reorganization (1992)    
The Harper-Hull Commission was convened to finish the work of the Thomas Commission 
whose work was interrupted by the election of third party Governor Lowell Weicker.  
Meanwhile, Connecticut was in the midst of the worst recession since the 1930s.  As Robert 
Kravchuk (1993) recounted Connecticut was deep in the throes of a recession the levels of 
which had not been seen since 1930. 
At the time of Weicker’s inauguration, Connecticut faced an estimated 1992 budget shortfall 
of some 2.4 billion.  Representing approximately 38% of projected fiscal year 1992 revenues, 
Connecticut’s deficit would be the largest in the state’s history, and the largest percentage 
wise in the nation (Kravchuk, 330) 
In tandem with the necessary financial reforms spearheaded by Governor Weicker, including 
the much maligned income tax, the governor viewed the work of the commission appointed 
by his predecessor as necessary to bring state government under fiscal control.  As 
Kravchuk further observed, state government was viewed as the culprit for Connecticut’s 
worsening financial condition.   
Many considered the root cause to be a state bureaucracy characterized by lethargy and 
inept leadership that lack the flexibility to respond to worsening economic conditions.  It 
was in fact, contributing to Connecticut’s fiscal decline.  Solution of Connecticut’s fiscal 
crisis and a comprehensive approach to administrative reform would, therefore, have to go 
hand in hand (1993, 331). 
Characteristic of fourth wave reform efforts, the Hull-Harper Commission was less ambitious 
in scope.  According to the Office of Legislative Review report (2002), “While the earlier 
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Thomas Commission review studied the internal efficiency and operation of agencies 
covering almost 90% of the state’s General Fund budget and employees, the Hull-Harper 
mandate was to review fewer agencies and to focus on cross-organizational and coordination 
issues.”  (Commission to Effect Government Reorganization, Final Report 1992).   The 
commission established seven task forces to study social services, educational services, 
service provider network, substance abuse prevention, information technology, job creation 
and standardization of finance, budget and purchasing practices.  The major thrust of the 
commission was to take a more targeted approach, and thus mainly dealt with the 
reorganization of Health and Human Services functions an object of considerable growth.  It 
also proposed the merger of community and technical colleges, and introduced the 
application of Total Quality Management principles such as benchmarking into Connecticut 
state government.    Many state agencies began to adopt performance measures as an 
overall approach known as Total Quality Management, part of the reinventing government 
movement forged by the federal government in the 1990s.  Brudney, Hebert, and Wright 
(1991) observed the trend of state governments that utilized the principles of reinventing 
government popularized by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) and first utilized during the time of 
the Clinton presidency. 
Yet despite its more narrowed focus, the Hull-Harper Commission managed to do what no 
previous commission had been able to do before which was to achieve a comprehensive 
reorganization of Connecticut state government as defined using Garnett’s criteria.   Chief 
among the recommendations were to consolidate the twelve health and human services 
agencies into four to avoid duplication and overlapping of services.  This resulted in the 
consolidation of the three largest human services agencies into one: the Department of 
Income Maintenance, Human Resources and Aging.  Not acted upon by the legislature was 
the proposal to create a consolidated Department of Developmental and Rehabilitative 
Services which would combine the departments of mental health and mental retardation and 
was vigorously opposed by interest groups (Janicki 2002).  The legislature also rejected 
Senate Bill 367 which would have reorganized higher education into two components:  the 
UCONN system and the State University and college system , as well as a proposal to 
consolidate the community, technical and two year UCONN branch campuses into five 
regional campuses (Janicki 2002)  Among the recommendations that passed included the 
reintroduction of the biennial budget which had originally been proposed by the Hull-Harper 
Commission and the creation of an Office of Finance within the Office of Policy and 
Management.   
Senate deliberations over Senate Bill 367 reveal some of the struggles between proponents 
and opponents of reform that revolve around the merger or consolidation of previously 
stand-alone agencies that would be subsumed under larger agencies, particularly the 
Department of Aging which legislators viewed as key constituency as they fought to retain it 
as a separate agency.  Others also questioned whether the claims of greater efficiency and 
cost savings would materialize.  In contrast to previous reorganization efforts, the 
Hull-Harper Commission had the distinct advantage having Senator Joe Harper serve in two 
capacities, one in serving as co-chair of the commission and also as a key senator during 
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legislative deliberations. This was an important tactic that undoubtedly helped the bill move 
through the senate. 
His remarks directly address the issue of cost savings that has repeatedly surfaced in 
legislative deliberations.  Another key factor in the relative success of Hull-Harper as 
compared to its predecessor commissions was the active role that Governor Weicker played 
in expending considerable time and energy to champion reorganization.  In fact, in a rare 
move which drew the attention of legislators was the fact that he personally testified before 
the committee.  This signaled to legislators the degree of seriousness he accorded state 
reorganization. Senator Harper references both of these points with the following remarks: 
The other thing that I think is important to mention is that the Hull-Harper Commission, 
when they made recommendations to us on human services, did so in an extraordinary 
manner, at least before the Human Services Committee and we were very pleased to have him 
there and Secretary Aronson came in to testify before the committee and at that time I asked 
both of those individuals whether they thought there would be a large dollar savings from the 
recommendations of the Hull-Harper commission on reorganization of human services.  
Both of these individuals said that was not the intention of the commission.  It was more the 
intention of that committee to look at trying to provide services in a better manner to the 
people of Connecticut and savings of dollars, if it occurred, was secondary. (Senate 
proceedings, May 2, 1992, p. 97) 
The Hull-Harper Commission also departed from previous commissions in the composition 
of the commission members.  The final report (1992) touted that fact that the group was 
“equally representative of these two branches of government and designed to involve the 
various and numerous stakeholders in reorganizing state government” (p. 2). 
5.6. State Reorganization and the 2010 Gubernatorial Election  
With an unprecedented fiscal crisis in state history dwarfing all previous crises in size, scope 
and real dollar amounts, Connecticut state government stood at a 3.4 billion dollar deficit 
looming for fiscal year 2011.  In a report, the National Governor’s Association stated the 
following:  
Fiscal 2010 presented the most difficult challenge for states’ financial management since the 
Great Depression and fiscal 2011 is expected to present states with similar challenges 
(National Governors Association 2010, p. vii).   
In this environment, state government reorganization figured prominently in the campaign 
rhetoric during the 2010 gubernatorial race and was put forth by both candidates as one 
means of tackling Connecticut’s fiscal problems.  With unemployment at 9.1% and a steady 
exodus of businesses leaving Connecticut, job growth was the top issue.  Reorganization, 
however, was put forth by both candidates as a way to put “Connecticut’s fiscal house in 
order” and by so doing enhance the overall economic climate.  Republican gubernatorial 
candidate Tom Foley was poised to undertake a sweeping overhaul of state government.  In 
fact, Foley, in an interview with the New Haven Register signaled his intentions of elected by 
stating that “declaring a fiscal emergency allows a governor to no longer be bound by union 
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contracts”.  As part of his campaign’s preparation for a possible win, the Foley camp had a 
blueprint for a state reorganization plan that would have effectively reduced from 85 to 20 the 
total number of state agencies.  The cornerstone of the plan was the creation of councils 
consisting of the leadership of existing state departments agencies under major functional 
groupings.  The establishment of a chief operating officer would oversee the reorganization 
of state government (Foley campaign document, October 2010).   
6. Governor Malloy and State Reorganization:  Incremental Consolidation of Higher 
Education 
While Malloy’s proposal lacked the specificity of Foley’s, his general position was to reduce 
to 51 from 83 the number of executive branch agencies for a total reduction of state 
government by 30%.  In the early months of his governorship, details of his plan were 
unveiled as part of the overall budget proposal for fiscal year 2011-12.  A cornerstone of his 
reorganization plan is a proposal to reorganize Connecticut’s system of higher education.   
To accomplish the overall goal of greater managerial control in higher education and to 
eliminate central office hierarchy in order to direct more dollars to teaching, Malloy has 
proposed to eliminate the various separate boards that oversee the Connecticut State 
University system, the community colleges and Charter Oak State College and combine them 
into one Board of Regents (Malloy, February 2011).  Malloy stated that such changes could 
result in $4.3 million dollars annually.  It should be noted that the reorganization of higher 
education has been a perennial item on the agenda since the Filer Commission in 1976 first 
suggested that economies of scale could be realized through the consolidation and merger of 
state universities and colleges.  In this respect, the eventual achievement of reorganization of 
higher education fits into Berkman and Reenock’s (2004) model of incremental 
consolidation.   
When the proposal was first unveiled in February, the professors’ union announced its 
intentions to mount a strong opposition to any cost cutting measures that would stem from a 
higher education reorganization ( Matt Clyburn, The Recorder, Professors’ Union Mobilize to 
Oppose Cost Cutting Measures, April 21, 2011).  Despite the vociferous opposition to the 
plan, An Act Concerning A Reorganization of Connecticut’s System of Public Higher 
Education was enacted by the General Assembly in May of 2011. 
Perhaps sensing that some of their colleagues may not share the same appetite for reform, 
conservative Democratic legislators Duff, Hartley and Slossberg co-sponsored legislation to 
grant “all extraordinary powers” to the chief executive that may be necessary to balance the 
budget during fiscal crises. (Lockhart 2011).  However, in response, Malloy’s administration 
viewed the proposal as unnecessary indicating that the current framework affords the 
governor adequate authority.  Finally, in a special session convened for the purpose of 
finalizing the budget, the legislature did grant the governor the authority to make cuts subject 
to legislative override. 
7. General Lessons from Recent Reorganization Efforts:  Routes to Reorganization 
The road to reorganization is strewn with overly ambitious plans on the part of commissions, 
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a lack of buy in or cooperation from state legislatures, and lingering doubts about the 
measurable cost savings that reorganization plans often promise.    As Young (2003) 
observed, the success of reorganization is dependent upon many variables the not the least of 
which are timing, tactics and adoption mechanisms.  Based on previous reorganization 
efforts in Connecticut, there have been varying degrees of success.  Given the great potential 
for failure, the question that emerges from this study is why do governors continue attempt to 
reorganize state government?  In drawing lessons from past reorganization efforts, Young 
(2003) offers the following: 
1) Timing – a key element to any successful reorganization effort is starting the process 
early in a governor’s term to take advantage of the honeymoon period when 
legislative goodwill is at a high level.   Governor Malloy signaled his intentions 
during the campaign and announced his plan soon after assuming office in February 
in conjunction in his budget address. 
2) Partnership with key legislators as part of any process as well as public agencies – the 
least successful cases of reorganization did not involve legislators while the most 
successful reorganizations placed them in a central role. 
3) Utilize an incremental approach to reorganization – allow for partial victories as 
opposed to a comprehensive approach where opposition to one section of a legislative 
package could undermine the whole effort. 
4) Party control of both the governor and the legislature may be more beneficial to the 
process and increase the prospects for adoption although this is not an automatic 
guarantee. 
5) The greater the magnitude of the fiscal crisis the greater the prospects for adoption by 
the legislature – the Filer and Harper-Hull Commissions were relatively successful 
and occurred during major fiscal crises.  Governor Malloy’s reorganization fits the 
crisis model and appears to have achieved relative success. 
6) Adoption tactics – Young found that the statutory method of adoption is preferable to 
executive orders which legislatures view as heavy handed and as he observed the 
“legislature takes great umbrage to this mechanism” (2003, 116) 
7) Governor’s role – a key element that emerges from this case study in terms of the 
likelihood of success is the role the governor plays.  “A governor’s determined 
involvement is instrumental to the success of restructuring when played out in a 
careful strategy of timing, tactical approaches, etc. (2003, 117) 
8) Promotional campaigns geared towards enlisting the supporting of various 
stakeholders – the greater the buy in by various constituencies the greater the 
likelihood of support for the reorganization plan. 
Even when governors have not been entirely successful, reorganization efforts do serve to 
focus attention on problems and while they may fall short of the goal have resulted in some 
efficiency gains through consolidation. 
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8. Lessons Drawn from Previous Reorganization Attempts in Connecticut 
When governors in Connecticut have succeeded in bringing out administrative reform, 
lessons from previous efforts have been gleaned for factors that appear to have been 
instrumental in their accomplishment.  It is evident from the most successful examples in 
the previous historical analysis, the Filer and Hull-Harper Commissions succeeded because 
governors championed the reform effort, there was strong bi-partisan support, key legislative 
leaders were included as commission members, and they shepherded the work through the 
General Assembly.  All of these coincided with severe fiscal crises that lent a sense of 
urgency to the proceedings and legitimized administrative reform as a means to tackle 
budgetary problems. 
9. Conclusion 
While public policy making tends towards the status quo in general, it is more pronounced 
when large scale reform of government is on the agenda.  Reforming state government 
through efforts to rearrange, consolidate, merge and possibly eliminate state agencies has met 
with considerable obstacles primarily the agencies themselves and their clientele groups. 
Yet, despite Connecticut’s penchant for steady habits, periodically policy makers have broken 
the log jam that has often characterized state government.  Reorganizations have been 
successful when public officials have attempted it in a more piecemeal and incremental 
fashion.  Time will tell whether the most recent reorganization effort will be successful.  
However, these legislator’s words will serve as sage advice regarding state reorganization: 
Efficient government depends on many variables whether good policies are chosen by the 
Governor and the legislature, whether competent people can be attracted to state service, 
whether federal policies encourage or discourage efficient state operations and whether 
service delivery systems are well designed to meet needs.  We are not claiming that better 
structure is a panacea for all of the problems of state government.  Good structure alone 
will not necessarily inspire sound decision, or recruit good people or avoid unnecessary 
spending or increase effective programs, but it is a good starting point for the improvement of 
state government. (Senator Baker, Final Senate debate, May 23, 1977) 
10. The Future of State Government Reorganization in the United States 
The Connecticut case study is illustrative of larger national trends in state reorganization both 
past and present.   Recent developments in Connecticut state government can be viewed as 
a microcosm of the major efforts by governors to come to terms with a nation-wide recession 
that has had ripple effects on state economies across the country since 2008.  In an article 
entitled “The Big Reset: State Governments After the Great Recession”, John Thomasian of 
the National Governors Association discussed the impact of the so called great recession on 
state government reorganization.  Noting that the severity and nature of the current recession 
is quantitatively and qualitatively different from other recessions, he argues that states need to 
take a different approach to remedy the ills currently befalling state government.  Instead of 
merely reorganizing state government, Thomasian believes that state government needs to be 
redesigned entirely in order to meet the needs of the 21st century.  The reset premise is 
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predicated on the notion that simply reorganizing state government will not be sufficient.  In 
order to cope with continuing shortfalls in revenue for the foreseeable future, state 
governments must engage in a total redesign in order to align their operations to the “new 
normal” state of affairs.  In order to cope with this new reality, state governments must 
undertake a thorough reexamination of core state services.  This reexamination entails 
deciding whether current budget priorities reflect the right mix of programs and services with 
the objective of determining whether there are major restructuring and cost savings available 
within each area (Thomasian, p. 15).  This is in sharp contrast to traditional reorganization 
efforts in which commissions did not delve into such policy decisions and often viewed such 
considerations as outside of their scope.   
In surveying the actions that state governments have recently taken, he noted that some likely 
candidates for downsizing and/or reorganization are corrections, K-12 education and public 
higher education.  Higher education comprises roughly 11-12 percent of state expenditures, 
placing it in third place after K-12 education and Medicaid.  In appears that Connecticut 
falls into line once again with national trends with the move to reorganize the system of 
public higher education during this past legislative session.   A future research agenda is 
warranted to analyze the extent to which the higher education reorganization has yielded the 
purported benefits and cost savings proponents promised in order to gain passage in the 
legislature.  What is certain is that Connecticut is in the midst of a significant effort to 
reorganize state government that will be a mainstay on the executive and legislative agenda 
for the foreseeable future. 
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